Speaking on the sidelines of a NATO summit in Brussels last week, Wallace was not indifferent. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – the northeastern side of the transatlantic alliance – had long warned of a possible Russian attack before Moscow launched its offensive against Ukraine in February. Now, as Russia intensifies its threats against the Baltic states – including access to the Kaliningrad enclave – and days before the organisation’s annual summit in Madrid, the debate over what kind of support should be provided by NATO allies has intensified. Germany announced last week that it would deploy an additional 3,500 troops to defend Lithuania, but would keep most of them stationed in its homeland. Berlin’s approach is supported by, among other things, Western allies: concerned about the cost of long-term development and the potential for provocation by Moscow, they argue that stockpiling equipment and flying troops in the short term is the smartest move. But vulnerable allies, such as Lithuania, say they need thousands of NATO troops, fully armed and equipped, to respond immediately to any Russian attack. Margarita šešelgytė, director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University, said the German approach “is not a good message for us”. “In terms of our security, [pre-positioned defence forces] is required. “We lack the strategic depth,” he said. “Ukraine was and is able to defend itself because of this. . . “The Baltic states could generally be occupied by Russian forces within a week.” Permanent bases, such as those set up by the United States in Germany after World War II, are expensive. Troops travel with their families, demanding large complexes with homes and schools. Instead, NATO’s “enhanced forward presence” of foreign-led combat teams in eastern countries, established in 2017 and expanded this spring, is based on “unaccompanied” troop deployments – soldiers in temporary rotation, in other words, sometimes living in tents, such as extensive military exercise. “I think this is the way forward,” said Kaisa Olongren, the Dutch defense minister. “We agree on the German approach, which I think fits in with a strategy we have to have for the whole east side of NATO, which means a stronger stance, but it is also flexible.” “It is also more sustainable, because you do not have to have everything and everyone in place, but you have to be very quick to respond and have the forces ready,” he added. The Netherlands is contributing troops to Germany’s NATO battle group in Lithuania. The United Kingdom leads the battle team in Estonia, Canada in Latvia and the United States in Poland.

Many NATO capitals argue that a more agile approach, with the ability to deploy quickly where needed, is a better deterrent than solid defenses that any potential invader could plan to avoid. But that depends on vulnerable border states trusting that their allies will grow fast enough with the strength to repel a concentrated attack. The US 82nd Airborne prides itself on being able to grow anywhere on the planet in 18 hours. But few, if any, other combat units of their size and ability can meet this. Ahead of Russia’s renewed invasion of Ukraine in February, NATO spoke of a tripwire strategy in which a few thousand troops in the east would serve as a first deterrent to attack before serious reinforcements could arrive. This is no longer considered valid. In the early hours of Putin’s attack in February, Western intelligence officials warned that Kyiv was likely to fall in three days, given the scale of the attack. In fact, a combination of Russian strategic mistakes and successful Ukrainian counterattacks stopped this initial attack. The Baltics worry that if Putin learns from this failure, NATO cavalry will arrive too late to prevent the fall of their capitals. “[The eastern allies] “He argued that the tripwire strategy does not really correspond to what we have seen happening in Ukraine,” Wallace said. “The first race is the most important race.”