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Of all the helicopters of the Russian Air Force, the Ka-52 is perhaps the most distinctive. Featuring an unusual coaxial rotor design and side-by-side crew seating arrangement, it has been on the front lines and engaged in the thickest fighting more than any other Russian attack helicopter since Russia’s offensive began in February. Because it was the most active, the Ka-52 also seems to take the most casualties from the Russian helicopters. In October, the British Ministry of Defense said at least 23 Ka-52s had been downed since February. This represents more than 25 percent of the Russian Air Force’s Ka-52 fleet in service and accounts for nearly half of Russia’s total helicopter losses in Ukraine, the ministry said.

The Alligator

                            A Russian Ka-52 helicopter at the Dubai Air Show in November 2021. GIUSEPPE CACACE/AFP via Getty Images

Designed by the highly regarded Kamov helicopter company, the Ka-52 — known in Russia as the “Alligator” and called the “Hokum-B” by NATO — is an improved variant of the Ka-50 Black Shark attack helicopter, introduced in 1995 . The Ka-52 entered service in 2011. It has a ceiling of 18,000 feet and a top speed of 186 mph. In addition to coaxial rotors, which eliminate the need for a tail rotor, it has ejection seats for its pilots – both rare features for helicopters. Two wing tips enable it to carry around 4,000 kg of rockets and missiles. It is also armed with a 30 mm autocannon mounted on the right side of the fuselage. Some variants also have a nose-mounted IR front-facing camera for targeting. Despite being one of Russia’s newest helicopters, the Ka-52 already has several variants. A Russian Ka-52K and its weapons at the MAKS air show near Moscow in July 2021. DIMITAR DILKOFF/AFP via Getty Images A version designed for naval operations was to be paired with two French-built Mistral-class amphibious ships bought by Moscow, but the deal was canceled in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Egypt then bought both ships from France and then bought the helicopters from Russia. The latest variant, the Ka-52M, first flew in August 2020. According to Russian media, it has several improvements, including a longer-range gyro-stabilized opto-electronic target acquisition and identification system and a new digital disk drive . The Ka-52’s armament also continues to be upgraded, with battlefield videos showing it firing a new anti-armor missile in Ukraine this summer.

War performance

                            A Ka-52 helicopter over Russia’s Krasnodar region in March 2019. VITALY TIMKIV/AFP via Getty Images

The Ka-52s have played an important role since Russia launched its offensive. In the first weeks of the war, they were seen supporting Russian airborne forces at Hostomel airfield and escorting Russian convoys. They were particularly useful for hunter-killer missions behind Ukrainian lines during the first two months of the war, sometimes flying as far as 50 kilometers into Ukrainian-controlled territory. Moscow regularly releases footage of Ka-52 operations, including other gunship helicopters such as the Mi-28 and Mi-24/35. According to a recent report by the Royal United Services Institute, Ka-52s are “more intensively used than other fleets, both during the day and especially at night, on all fronts in Ukraine.” A damaged Russian Ka-52 helicopter at Hostomel Airport near Kyiv in July. Maxym Marusenko/NurPhoto via Getty Images But the high operating rate has also led to a high attrition rate. The UK says 23 Ka-52s have been lost, while the open-source tracking site Oryx has counted 25 as downed since mid-November. This compares with the loss of only eight Mi-24/-35 helicopters and six Mi-28 helicopters, according to Oryx’s calculations. These losses are more than a quarter of the 90 Ka-52s in active service before the war, according to the British Ministry of Defence. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies’ 2021 Military Balance report, compiled before the war, said Russia has a total of 133 Ka-52s.) The ministry cited man-portable air defense systems, such as the US-made Stinger missile, and a lack of “consistent overhead cover by fighter jets” as the most likely reasons for the disproportionate casualties. Russia’s continued inability to suppress and destroy Ukrainian air defenses has made it difficult for Russian aircraft to partner with helicopters to conduct effective combined arms operations — in part because so many Russian aircraft have been downed. A Ka-52 helicopter at the 2016 International Army Games in Russia. REUTERS/Maxim Shemetov The Ka-52’s heavy losses also come from a number of shortcomings, including less armor and poor shock absorption. Less armor means the Ka-52 is particularly vulnerable to shoulder-fired missiles and small arms fire. Poor shock absorption makes it more difficult for the helicopter to acquire targets and affects the accuracy of its weapons, particularly unguided rockets. This forces the Ka-52s to move closer to the targets, increasing their exposure. The Ka-52 also uses anti-tank guided missiles that require the helicopter to remain nearly stationary so the missile can hit its target. This also increases its exposure – so much so that Ukrainian soldiers appear to have shot down Ka-52s with ground-launched anti-tank missiles. Russian helicopters have changed tactics in response to Ukraine’s successful use of shoulder-fired missiles and other air defense systems, but Russian forces still need close air support. Consequently, Ukraine continues to claim that it kills the Ka-52. With newer, more modern air defense systems arriving in Ukraine, these losses will likely increase.