Last Wednesday (June 15 – and Xi’s birthday), Russian news sources first reported from the Kremlin that Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart, President Xi, had a “warm and friendly” phone call. during which Xi had promised China’s continued support to Russia. Russian news sources quoted the Kremlin as saying that President Xi had “noted the legitimacy” of Russia’s actions to protect itself “in the face of security challenges posed by external forces”. Russian sources went on to say that the Kremlin had stressed that Putin and Xi had agreed that Sino-Russian relations were at an “unprecedented level” and that they planned to deepen ties in energy, finance and industry. China has not refuted any of the Kremlin’s statements on the content of the lengthy call, nor has it attempted to reduce the specific language used in the statements. In addition, Beijing has not yet condemned – or openly criticized in any way – Russia’s invasion of Ukraine’s independent sovereign state. In early April, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian blamed Russia for the US invasion of Ukraine. to participate in five rounds of eastward expansion in the last two decades since 1999, “he said during a virtual summit with European Union leaders. With Russian troops still on the ground in large parts of Ukraine and keeping the European theatrical troops of the US and their NATO allies focused on the “threat of outbreak” from this war, Xi – the same day as his call to Putin – for the first time time has never signed a document providing the legal basis for the Chinese military to carry out missions other than those directly required by a war against China. According to local news reports, the new directive signed by Xi will: “Standardize and provide the legal basis for Chinese troops to carry out missions such as disaster relief, humanitarian aid, escort and peacekeeping and protection.” of China’s national sovereignty, security and development interests [italics are OilPrice.com’s]As other Chinese news sources pointed out, the order signed by Xi, which entered into force on June 15, was signed by:[Comprises 59 articles and six chapters] serving as the legal basis for non-military military operations [and] “They aim to protect the lives and property of the people, to ensure national sovereignty, security and development interests, and to ensure world peace and regional stability.” Xi has always seen self-governing Taiwan as an inalienable part of Chinese territory, just as Putin has always viewed Ukraine as essentially part of Russia. China has long pledged to “reunite” Taiwan with China, just as Putin tried to “reunite” Ukraine with Russia – in both cases, regardless of the wishes of the citizens of those two countries. China has long said it “wants” to achieve this “reunification” of Taiwan by peaceful means, but – most importantly – has never ruled out the use of force to achieve its goal. And Russia did not need a clear and present danger to its own interests to dine on its invasion of Ukraine in February. For their part, the US has not deployed open ground troops in Ukraine or imposed a no-fly zone across the country, in part because it has no legal jurisdiction to do so – as Ukraine is not a member of NATO – but mainly because fears escalation into nuclear war with the great nuclear power Russia. Both of these reasons for the US lack of a tangible response apply to Taiwan: first, it is not a member of NATO or a similar version of Asia-Pacific. and second, the danger of escalating into a nuclear war with China’s great nuclear power is real. China is aware of all this and is almost certain to be plotting to launch a “special operation” – as Russia calls its invasion of Ukraine – against Taiwan. This would give the US all the exit clauses it has for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as China could insist it is just a “reunification” and would never formally declare war. At the same time as the political maneuver of China and Russia for their respective “reunifications” continues, so does the supply and demand of oil and gas between not only Russia and China but also for further – mass – oil supplies that may come from Iran and Venezuela, to name just two of the largest. Venezuela has the largest crude oil reserves in the world, by far, according to the EIA (and figures from all other major industrial players): 300 billion barrels more (far more than Saudi Arabia, even though Saudi Arabia are true). Iran has about 158 billion barrels and Russia has about 80 billion barrels. These figures do not include oil from major oil states that we could say – because of their relations with either Iran, Russia or China – that they have a favorable tendency towards this formal or informal Sino-Russian-led alliance. . Iran has a long-standing historical influence in Iraq (through a combination of political, economic and military factors), which holds more than 140 billion barrels of crude oil reserves, although this is probably much higher, according to OilPrice.com. The UAE has been particularly reluctant in recent months not to be considered aligned with the US, and has 98 billion barrels of reserves. And there has been an extremely significant shift from the US-led bloc to the Chinese-led bloc from Saudi Arabia, as discussed in depth in my new book on global oil markets, and the Kingdom is supposed to have a little more from 268 billion barrels of crude oil reserves. A small increase in daily crude oil production from these countries leads to extremely worrying conclusions for those who want to reduce oil prices, if even half of the total was deducted from the total volume available for supply in a free-flowing oil market. . Going down the list of countries most likely to choose to side with China-Russia, if and when required – in the case of a Chinese “special operation” to “reunite” Taiwan, for example – and in chronological order: Russia can easily produce 11 million barrels per day (bpd), Iran 4.5 million bpd, Venezuela currently below 1 million bpd, but may increase much, Iraq 4.5 million bpd, UAE 3 million bpd and Saudi Arabia 10 million bpd (and if Saudi Arabia aligns with China – Russia after Kuwait would follow, adding another 2.5 million bpd). The total is 36.5 million bpd, out of the usual about 90-100 million bpd used in the world, but readers can add or subtract countries to this number according to their own views, of course. It is worth noting here, however, the disproportionate extreme impact on oil pricing of a relatively small supply disruption in recent months, such as those in Libya. By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com More top readings from Oilprice.com:
